Foreword

1. Executive summary

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Overall conclusion: Do the current franchise agreements provide value-for-money?
1.3 Our assessments in more detail

2. About the franchising of Melbourne's train and tram system

2.1 Recent history
2.2 Costs of operating the metropolitan train and tram system
2.3 Audit objective and scope
2.4 Audit method and report structure

3. Did the responsible agencies provide effective advice to government?

3.1 Background
3.2 Did the responsible agencies provide effective advice to government?
3.3 Conclusion

4. Did DoI allocate risks effectively?

4.1 Background
4.2 Did DoI allocate risks effectively?
4.3 Conclusion and recommendations

5. Were public sector benchmarks developed and used effectively during the negotiation process?

5.1 Background
5.2 Were DoI's public sector benchmarks robustly developed?
5.3 Were the public sector benchmarks used effectively to evaluate offers and assist in negotiations?
5.4 Overall conclusion and recommendation

6. Did DoI effectively use other negotiation strategies?

6.1 Background
6.2 Did DoI effectively use its other negotiation stratetgies?
6.3 Conclusion

7. Did DoI observe probity requirements?

7.1 Background
7.2 Was DoI's probity plan adequate?
7.3 Did DoI effectively implement its probity plan?
7.4 Did DoI adequately manage potential conflicts of interest?
7.5 Overall conclusion and recommendation

8. Did DoI build in adequately performance monitoring arrangements?

8.1 Background
8.2 Is DoI's performance monitoring adequate?
8.3 Did DoI allocate performance monitoring responsibilities to ensure effective monitoring?
8.4 Will DoI's performance monitoring framework enable it to remedy adverse performance?
8.5 Overall conclusion

Appendix A. Difficulties with 1999 franchise agreements

Appendix B. Changes made to the public sector benchmarks

Appendix C. Results of audit of DoI's performance monitoring and payment arrangements

Appendix D. Glossary