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Victoria's prison system: |
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Victoria's prison system: |
8.2 At the time of the inspections, with some key exceptions, each prison generally met the audit criteria for the delivery of appropriate security, catering and health care services. Audit found a number of issues of a systemic nature as well as some specific matters relating to the operation of individual prisons that, if addressed, would lead to the more effective and efficient achievement of the Government's correctional objectives.
8.3 Key suggestions for improvement arising from the examination of the 3 operational areas are outlined below:
Prison security
8.5 As indicated in Part 7 of this Report, there are approximately 20 service delivery outcomes included in each Prison Services Agreement. These outcomes are expressed in the form of numeric targets and vary depending on the profile of prisoners within each prison. The Agreements also include 45 areas of prison operations and a range of service standards and/or procedures to be followed. The outcomes in relation to the private prisons relate to a performance-linked fee whereas CORE, which operates the public prisons, is funded directly by the Department of Justice irrespective of the level of performance achieved.
8.6 Prison management is required to report monthly to the Correctional Services Commissioner on its performance against 18 outcomes contained in the Prison Service Agreements.
8.7 The 18 service delivery outcomes reported to the Correctional Services Commissioner are listed below:
8.8 There are 2 other service delivery outcomes which relate to accreditation of health services provided by the prison operators. Currently, these are not part of the reporting framework, as they do not come into effect until 2 years after operations commenced.
8.9 All health service providers within prisons are required, under the Prison Services Agreements, to seek accreditation from an agreed authority body in healthcare standards. Port Phillip Prison must obtain accreditation from The Australian Council on Healthcare Standards for its secondary and tertiary medical services within 2 years of commencing operation.
8.10 The Agreements state that accreditation must be obtained. While the 2 parties can initially work outside the Agreement, it is important that they obtain some form of accreditation within 2 years of commencing operation.
8.11 If providers do not seek accreditation they must satisfy the Prisoner Health Care Monitoring Unit of the Department of Human Services that they have obtained an alternative and acceptable form of accreditation. For example, Fulham Correctional Centre has sought an exemption because it has achieved ISO 9002 quality accreditation. The Unit does not consider this particular accreditation to be sufficient in itself because it is not "medical" specific. It has asked the prison operator at Fulham Correctional Centre to identify a course of action more suitable and present it for consideration.
8.12 The monitoring undertaken by the Correctional Services Commissioner focuses on those activities which are measured against the service delivery outcomes. However, as there has been little or no monitoring of certain key activities against outcomes, audit selected for detailed examination 4 of these areas critical to the effective management of prison operations where audit perceived that the Report could add value. These areas were:
8.13 The specialists engaged by audit to examine each of these areas developed criteria in the form of checklists. The criteria were derived from the correctional standards, legislation, Prison Services Agreements, and operational manuals, and was also based on the expertise and knowledge of the specialist. The checklists were used to assess the performance of the 6 selected prisons. Detailed comments on the results of these assessments were included in comprehensive reports provided to the Department. Summary comments in relation to prison security, prison catering and health care services are outlined later in this Part of the Report.
8.14 In relation to human resource management practices the following paragraphs briefly outline the key findings contained in the report prepared by the specialist engaged by audit to examine this area. The findings were substantially of a positive nature, however, some of the more important suggestions for improvement are listed below:
8.15 While the Commissioner's Office advised audit that quality assurance procedures assessing delivery and outputs relating to recruitment and training had not been conducted, there will be a shift towards content, delivery and an output focus in future.
8.16 The application of appropriate security measures for the effective operation of prisons is of fundamental importance to the community, prison management and prisoners themselves.
8.17 Breaches of security contributing to prisoner escapes, deaths in custody, prisoner mutilations, prison riots and the trafficking of contraband including illicit drugs are matters of great sensitivity and concern to society. As such the Government, in encouraging the involvement of the private sector in the operation of prisons, needs to ensure that security arrangements in place in both public as well as private prisons are effective and risks are adequately mitigated.
8.18 Given the above background and irrespective of whether a prison is classified as maximum, medium or minimum, prison authorities are faced with the complex issue of having to strike an appropriate balance between providing a level of security within a harmonious prison environment that meets industry standards and community expectations, while also ensuring prison operations are conducted in a cost-effective manner.
8.19 In reaching conclusions on the adequacy of prison security across a range of prisons, it needs to be recognised that some prisons such as the Port Phillip Prison had been in operation for only a relatively short period of time and the audit observations were based on circumstances in place at a particular point of time.
8.20 While operational manuals for the 6 prisons examined by the security specialist contained adequate direction for the management of security-related matters, the effectiveness of these arrangements can really only be judged by the way they are applied during an emergency or live situation.
8.21 Overall the specialist found that the prisons were generally complying with the requirements of prison services agreements by providing:
8.22 All 6 prisons examined contained the actual number of security-related incidents within the acceptable limits specified in the Prison Services Agreements for various periods to 28 February 1999. The exceptions were that:
8.23 From a central management perspective the development of comprehensive agreements between the Minister for Corrections and prison operators that detailed targeted security-related outcomes was a positive feature, as was the advent of risk assessments for CORE prisons. Risk management would clearly be strengthened by the introduction of similar assessments for the private prisons.
8.24 Security measures that were generally found to be satisfactorily applied across the 6 prisons are summarised below:
8.25 The audit, however, also disclosed a range of weaknesses from a systemic perspective as well as various shortcomings in individual prisons that require attention. Issues of a systemic nature that need to be addressed included:
8.26 Weaknesses that were specific to individual prisons comprised the following:
Background
8.27 Security matters are among the most significant issues facing prison management. A primary obligation for any prison operator is to ensure prisoners are contained and supervised in a safe, humane and just manner. As prisons must also be secure, prison operators are faced with a constant challenge of balancing security requirements with correctional objectives.
8.28 The Prison Services Agreements include the following over-riding requirement with respect to security:
"The Contractor must:
(a) provide an effective security system which ensures the protection of the community by minimising the risk of prisoner escape;
(b) provide a secure working and living environment for prisoners, visitors and staff; and
(c) within the prison, control any article or substance which may threaten the good order or security of the prison."
8.29 The key elements of a sound security system in prisons are the utilisation of contemporary surveillance equipment, appropriately trained and selected prison officers, and formal policies and procedures for security and safety standards.
8.30 The classification of prisons according to maximum, medium and minimum security governs the measures applicable to security arrangements for each prison. The extent to which security poses a risk both within prisons in terms of fellow inmates and prison management as well as to the wider community is essentially dependent on the type of prison in question and the adequacy of the procedures in place.
8.31 Given the above, a specialist engaged by audit assessed the adequacy of system-wide operational functions in conjunction with individual security arrangements across the 6 selected prisons. Contractual obligations, operational manuals, general industry standards and specific security standards operating in each prison were used as the basis for establishing checklists to evaluate security procedures in place.
8.32 In terms of the new prisons, audit acknowledges the view held by the prison operators that the process can go on for up to 2 years before a prison becomes fully operational. As such, any interpretation of the comments made throughout this Part of the Report relating to newly constructed prisons need to be cognisant of this view. Notwithstanding this philosophy it is important that appropriate security measures be in place during this period when the risk is potentially higher.
Positive features of prison security
8.33 In examining the security practices at the 6 selected prisons the specialist developed a checklist addressing 18 factors considered essential for adequate prison security. The results of the examination of these factors are listed below.
Common findings across prisons
8.34 Audit found that satisfactory arrangements were in place at each prison to address the following 7 factors:
8.35 Satisfactory arrangements in relation to the following 8 factors were found to be in place at 5 out of the 6 prisons examined:
8.36 The individual prisons found not to satisfactorily comply with the above factors were Port Phillip Prison (6 factors) and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre (2 factors).
8.37 In relation to the other 3 factors, the audit revealed that:
Improvements required to security arrangements of a systemic nature
Central arrangements
Risk assessments
8.38 The audit disclosed that CORE conducts formalised risk assessments for the public prison system in terms of prison security. These assessments, which are conducted regularly, comprise a detailed review of operational security matters such as observation checks of access procedures.
8.39 In audit opinion, the Correctional Services Commissioner should ensure that private prison operators also conduct regular risk assessments using external expertise so that all key risks are identified and included in their operational manuals and annual security plans.
Review of buildings for all prisons
8.40 Each of the facilities examined was found to be well-equipped, with processes in place to adequately address the maintenance of buildings and facilities. At the time of audit, there was provision in the prison services agreements for monitoring the condition of the prison infrastructure through an independent process. Up until now, the Major Projects Branch within the Department of Justice conducted the first annual review of buildings in the new prisons.
8.41 Audit is of the view that all monitoring of prison infrastructure required under the Prison Services Agreement should be co-ordinated through the Commissioner's Office. The Correctional Services Commissioner should arrange for an assessment of all prison buildings which is independent of the Department, especially maintenance planning in terms of appropriate security arrangements.
Technology for the Victoria Police Prisons Squad
8.42 The Victoria Police Prisons Squad, a specialist investigative body within the Criminal Investigation Branch, is primarily concerned with prison operations and is responsible for criminal investigation and intelligence gathering throughout the prison system.
8.43 In conducting a comparison of security-related incidents in prisons such as assaults on prisoners and detection of contraband that were reported to Victoria Police over the past 3 years, the audit disclosed that the relevant information was recorded manually and this impeded meaningful analysis. Manual recording also severely limited the capacity for cross-referencing of names or aliases and other incident details to assist in linking or investigating matters. The analysis conducted by audit disclosed that the most frequent security-related incidents involved assaults on prisoners and drug-related matters.
8.44 In the absence of contractual provision for reporting notifiable incidents to Victoria Police, the Correctional Services Commissioner should encourage prison operators to work closely with the Victoria Police Prisons Squad to assist in the development of a suitable system for recording reported incidents, including those relating to breaches in prison security.
Co-operation between prison operators
8.45 A lack of cohesion between private and public prison operators is not totally unexpected given the short period that private prisons have operated and the commercial realities of the evolving multi-service provider prison industry. This lack of cohesion has led to a fragmented system that limits opportunities for specialist staff such as key security personnel to work more closely together to identify and address common issues. For example this discourages innovative solutions to be shared between prison operators, or the co-operation necessary for joint operations between prisons involving intelligence matters.
8.46 Security in prisons is critical. Accordingly, audit is of the view that, despite the emerging commercial tensions, the Correctional Services Commissioner needs to promote greater co-operation between prison operators. One avenue of response would be to establish an industry security forum that meets regularly to consider matters of mutual interest.
Banning of certain visitors
8.47 The system for banning the access of certain visitors to Victorian prisons is not consistent across all prisons. Under current arrangements, a person who is banned from entering one prison, e.g. on grounds of bringing contraband into the prison during a visit, may be able to gain access to another prison as prison operators do not have shared intelligence networks such as industry-wide hand scanning systems and visitors may be able to produce false identification. Port Phillip Prison already has a hand scanning system in place which enables it to identify previously banned visitors to that prison. Audit has been advised by CORE that it is currently trialing a finger scanning visitor identification system at Barwon and Loddon Prisons with a view to introducing it across all CORE prisons.
8.48 Because of industry fragmentation, audit acknowledges the difficulty in developing a common approach to the detection of banned visitors. Nevertheless, it may be useful for the Correctional Services Commissioner to encourage prison operators to introduce compatible scanning systems across all prisons to minimise the potential for suspect or barred persons gaining access to any prison.
8.49 Audit observed that staff had difficulty in maintaining full security over the visits centres where visitors meet with prisoners. Staff were required to strip search prisoners at the end of contact visits immediately after their visitor had departed while at the same time maintaining supervision in the visits centres, including any outdoor areas. In the larger prisons, there was a high turnover with in excess of 100 visitors and prisoners in each centre at any given time. In audit opinion, these conditions restricted the ability of staff to maintain a span of control across the visits centres.
8.50 The Correctional Services Commissioner should encourage prison operators to develop formal "span of control" policies to ensure appropriate supervision during visits. Such a policy should include minimum staffing requirements and documentation of all key supervisory tasks, and form part of renegotiated prison services agreements.
Supervision of prisoners
Electronic surveillance
8.51 The use of an electronic surveillance mechanism such as closed circuit television can assist custodial officers in monitoring prisoners.
8.52 The audit disclosed that all prisons examined, except for the smaller minimum security Dhurringile Prison, utilised electronic surveillance equipment covering perimeter and prison grounds. However, most prisons did not have adequate surveillance equipment operating in prisoner accommodation units and kitchens. Generally, it is argued by prison operators that electronic surveillance has been sacrificed because human supervision is considered more effective. Audit is of the view that this situation was particularly significant in the case of Port Phillip Prison which did not have sufficient staff to maintain adequate observation of these areas. In the case of the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre and Dhurringile Prison, there were no custodial staff rostered to supervise prisoners working in the kitchens on weekends. The use of closed circuit television provides an opportunity for constant observation of specific areas, evidence for post-incident review, and as a training and de-briefing tool for staff.
8.53 The Correctional Services Commissioner, in supporting prison operators to provide the most effective configuration of security measures, should encourage the use of electronic video surveillance with recording capacity in areas with limited or no staff supervision of prisoners.
Policy for retaining video surveillance tapes
8.54 Video surveillance tapes are retained for evidentiary and staff training purposes. None of the prisons examined by audit had a formal system whereby video tapes were retained.
8.55 To improve the quality of evidence and post-incident debriefings, and consistent with standard practice in the security industry, the Correctional Services Commissioner should request that all prisons retain their video surveillance tapes for a period of 14 days.
Monitoring and sanctions for illicit drug use and the introduction of incentives
8.56 The Commissioner is responsible for the oversight of the Government's Prisons Drug Strategy. This strategy is intended to provide a consistent framework for all aspects surrounding the management of drugs in prisons. The Department indicated that this is a very complex issue requiring considerable work and it has been, and continues to be, a very high priority task for the Commissioner.
8.57 A critical component of the Prisons Drug Strategy is the provision of a range of education and treatment options for prisoners. The Department advised that "these programs were significantly expanded as a result of funds granted through the Government's "Turning the Tide" initiative against drug abuse. A grant of $5.3m over three years was provided to upgrade Corrections programs. This funding has been used to supplement prison drug education and treatment services in both public and private prisons to ensure that a wide range of programs are accessible to all prisoners. Programs have now been fully implemented and program evaluations are to be completed, in accordance with "Turning the Tide" requirements, early in 1999-2000".
8.58 The Commissioner has addressed the question of illicit drug use in prisons through the introduction of a 3-tiered holistic approach involving prevention, detection and treatment. Effective implementation of the prevention and detection aspects of this holistic approach requires the support of complementary security measures and sanctions for those prisoners identified as drug users within the prisons. Those prisoners who have successfully participated in education and treatment programs may achieve modification to their drug user status.
8.59 Given the supply of illicit drugs to prisoners can only, at best, be minimised without the use of expensive detection-based technology, the monitoring and detection procedures, including the testing of prisoners' urine samples, were considered to be adequate.
8.60 Sanctions in relation to breaches of prison security could be applied in a fairer manner if sanctions regarding "minor" drug usage by prisoners were not as severe. For example, a prisoner returning a positive result for cannabis or alcohol use receives the same penalty as a user of hard drugs such as amphetamines or heroin. An example of the severity of sanctions imposed according to the drug user status of prisoners, irrespective of the type of drugs involved, is demonstrated below:
8.61 The severity of the above sanctions varies substantially from the level of penalties imposed through the judicial system which reflects the seriousness of the offence and an offender's prior convictions. For example, first offender cannabis users are automatically cautioned or given a good behaviour bond.
8.62 In a prison environment, the severity of sanctions for relatively minor breaches could have an adverse effect in terms of the safety of, and co-operation between, custodial staff and individual prisoners. Some of the implications that could arise are listed below:
8.63 In audit opinion prisoners who commit a "minor" drug offence for the first time in prison, such as for cannabis use, should receive a lesser penalty than that received by a hard drug user. This approach if adopted will provide some incentive to a prisoner to refrain from taking hard drugs by continuing to use drugs of a less harmful nature. With regard to all prisoners who have committed 3 or more drug-related offences in prison, consideration should also be given to introducing incentives for them to break the drug use cycle. A pilot program should be considered to determine whether such concepts are beneficial to the welfare of prisoners.
8.64 The Department recently advised it had engaged consultants to carry out a wide-ranging evaluation of the Prisons Drug Strategy.
Qualifications and role of security staff
8.65 Most staff in prisons with responsibility for security have many years of experience and generally have no formal security management qualifications. In addition, the range of these and other associated responsibilities weakens their capacity to focus on security matters.
8.66 The audit found that, without detracting from the importance of security personnel having an appropriate level of experience, there was not an appropriate balance between experience and qualifications. In addition, the audit revealed that insufficient attention had been given to attaching a high professional status to the position of security manager.
8.67 To address these shortcomings, the Correctional Services Commissioner should encourage each prison operator to appoint a security manager with specific responsibility for ongoing maintenance of security within their respective prison. In audit opinion an appropriate balance between length of service and suitable qualifications would enhance the capacity of prison operators to provide leading edge security management.
8.68 The Commissioner should also consider making arrangements for certain staff to possess formal qualifications in security management and establishing industry standards for competencies and qualifications for these prison security managers.
Procedural standards and strategies
8.69 Procedural standards and strategies operating in each prison included in Prison Services Agreements are intended to cover security-related matters in a range of different ways.
8.70 A typical Prison Services Agreement requires the contractor to provide a safe and secure environment within a prison which includes:
8.71 Correctional Policy and Management Standards for men's prisons in Victoria provide for the following outcomes from prison security systems:
8.72 While operational manuals for the 6 prisons examined by the audit specialist contained adequate direction for the management of security-related matters, the effectiveness of these arrangements can really only be judged by the way they are applied during an emergency or live situation. If procedures are rigorously tested and staff possess the required level of knowledge and understanding of their application, a satisfactory framework should be in place for prison security to be maintained.
8.73 Unlike drug, violence and sexual offender strategies, formal strategies for prison security, including the use of advanced technology were not in place due to limited opportunities for system development and interaction between providers. Audit is of the view that this situation has arisen because there is a focus on meeting service delivery outcomes rather than seeking the most innovative or effective solution to security issues.
8.74 As Prison Services Agreements are re-negotiated during the next 2 years, provision should be made for:
8.75 Apart from the above issues of a systemic nature, the examination of security arrangements at the 6 selected prisons resulted in the following observations for each prison.
Port Phillip Prison
Overall comment
8.76 Port Phillip Prison is a privately-owned and operated maximum, medium and minimum security prison, which commenced operation in September 1997. It is a modern, well-equipped facility that is undergoing extensive review in terms of its organisational and staffing structure, operating procedures and general correctional activity.
8.77 In general terms, the prison met the criteria established by audit for the implementation of appropriate security arrangements although there was room for improvement. This was openly acknowledged by prison management.
Actual performance compared with outcome targets
8.78 Table 8A shows the performance of Port Phillip Prison for the period 10 September 1998 to 28 February 1999 against certain security-related service delivery outcomes contained in the Prison Services Agreement.
Actual
Required performance for
Category of service period
service delivery outcomes delivery 10 September
outcomes 1998 to 28
(not more than) February 1999
Escapes (prisoners per year) 1 0
Self-mutilation/attempted suicide
(percentage of average muster) 11.783 6.2130
Assaults on prisoners by other
prisoners where an incident is
recorded (per 100 prisoner years) 24.13 12.426
Assaults by staff (per 100 prisoner 0 0
years)
Assaults on staff or other persons
where an incident is recorded (per 4.33 4.020
100 prisoner years)
Drug testing - percentage of
prisoners tested who test positive
for non-prescribed drug use as a
result of random testing over time 8.00 5.71
(per cent)
8.79 As indicated in the above table the prison has performed well in comparison with the limits set for the security-related outcomes for the period to 28 February 1999.
Security arrangements that need improvement
Non-compliance with security requirements
8.80 Audit observed a number of instances of non-compliance with Port Phillip Prison's operational manual. These included failing to search and then escort vehicles entering the prison.
8.81 Audit recommends that prison management regularly conduct assessments of staff compliance with documented policies and procedures to ensure the maintenance of security standards at all times.
Testing of new security procedures
8.82 At the time of the visit to Port Phillip Prison, audit was advised that its new security procedures for emergency response would not be tested before their submission to the Correctional Services Commissioner for approval. The process of developing new security procedures was led by a staff member with no specific security expertise.
8.83 The Commissioner should insist that major variations to, or the addition of, newly developed security procedures be tested under controlled conditions to ensure the prison environment and resourcing arrangements are adequate, prior to submission to the Commissioner for approval.
Sally-ports
8.84 A sally-port is the area of the prison through which all vehicles enter and exit. The sally-port has doors at each end and it is here that vehicles are stopped and searched before they are allowed to proceed. In a maximum security prison, any weaknesses detected in the operation of the sally-port would constitute a major security risk.
8.85 Port Phillip Prison's main sally-port does not contain a vehicle inspection pit to facilitate the physical inspection of the undercarriage of vehicles. As a result prison staff have to rely on the use of hand held mirrors for vehicle inspections to detect instances of illegal entry of contraband concealed under a vehicle. The use of a vehicle inspection pit would enable more efficient and effective searches to be conducted of vehicles entering or leaving the prison.
8.86 In audit opinion, given that Port Phillip Prison is a maximum security prison, the Department should evaluate whether there is a demonstrated need for the installation of an inspection pit in the Prison's main vehicle sally-port.
Unescorted vehicles
8.87 To ensure that prison security is maintained at all times, vehicles entering a prison must be escorted by custodial staff while within the confines of the prison.
8.88 During the audit inspection, instances were observed where vehicles were permitted to enter Port Phillip Prison and proceed to their destination unescorted, despite operational procedures prohibiting such occurrences.
8.89 The prison operator needs to ensure that procedures for escorting vehicles within the prison are consistently adhered to at all times.
Induction program for prisoners
8.90 Formal induction information for prisoners, explaining the rules of the prison and the rights and responsibilities of prisoners, was not in place at the time of audit's visit.
8.91 The prison operator at Port Phillip Prison should implement an induction package that provides prisoners with appropriate information relating to prisoner rights and responsibilities. Consideration should also be made for illiterate prisoners or those with English language difficulties.
Other matters
8.92 Audit observed the following breaches of prison security which require the attention of the prison operator at Port Phillip Prison:
Fulham Correctional Centre
Overall comment
8.93 The privately-owned and operated Fulham Correctional Centre, a modern well-equipped facility, is classified as a medium and minimum security prison. The centre, which commenced operation in March 1997, has a continuous improvement program designed to maintain procedures at the highest level.
Modern facilities at the
privately-operated Fulham Correctional Centre.
8.94 The audit found that the centre met the criteria established by audit for the implementation of appropriate security arrangements. From a security perspective the management structure, staffing levels and organisational philosophies at all levels of the operation were considered impressive. It was encouraging to find that the centre had recorded its policies and procedures on a computer system which is accessible to all staff members at any time.
Actual performance compared with outcome targets
8.95 Table 8B shows the performance of the Fulham Correctional Centre for the period 7 April 1998 to 28 February 1999 against certain security-related service delivery outcomes contained in the Prison Services Agreement.
Required Actual
Category of service performance
service delivery outcomes delivery for period 7
outcomes (not April 1998 to 28
more than) February 1999
Escapes (prisoners per year) 1 0
Self-mutilation/attempted suicide
(percentage of average muster) 2.19 0.94
Assaults on prisoners by other
prisoners where an incident is
recorded (per 100 prisoner years) 10.38 8.13
Assaults by staff (per 100 prisoner 0 0
years)
Assaults on staff or other persons
where an incident is recorded (per 3.50 0.76
100 prisoner years)
Drug testing - percentage of
prisoners tested who test positive
for non-prescribed drug use as a
result of random testing over time 7.9 7.74
(per cent)
8.96 As indicated in the above table the centre has performed well in comparison with the limits set for the security-related outcomes for the period to 28 February 1999.
Security arrangements that need improvement
8.97 Several operational areas at the Fulham Correctional Centre need to be addressed as outlined below:
8.98 In audit opinion, there is a need for:
Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre
Overall comment
8.99 The Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre, which was commissioned as a privately-owned and operated prison in August 1996, is a modern, well-equipped maximum, medium and minimum security facility that is subject to ongoing internal review. The management structure, staffing levels and organisational philosophies at all levels are adequate.
8.100 The audit disclosed that the centre generally met the criteria established by audit in terms of implementing appropriate security arrangements.
Actual performance compared with outcome targets
8.101 Table 8C shows the performance of the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre for the period 23 August 1998 to 28 February 1999 against certain security-related service delivery outcomes contained in the Prison Services Agreement.
Required Actual
Category of service performance for
service delivery outcomes delivery period 23 August
outcomes (not 1998 to 28
more than) February 1999
Escapes (per 2 years) 1 0
Self-mutilation/attempted suicide
(per 100 receptions) 3.8 7.2
Assaults on prisoners by other
prisoners where an incident is
recorded (per 100 prisoner years) 30.0 35.966
Assaults by staff (per prisoner 0 0
year)
Assaults on staff or other persons
where an incident is recorded (per 10.0 7.193
100 prisoner years)
Drug testing - percentage of
prisoners tested who test positive
for non-prescribed drug use as a
result of random testing over time 8.26 6.94
(per cent)
8.102 As indicated in the above table, the centre has exceeded the limits set for self-mutilations and attempted suicides and assaults on prisoners by other prisoners in the period to 28 February 1999. The limits set for escapes, assaults by staff, assaults on staff or other persons, and the percentage of prisoners testing positive for drugs have not been exceeded for the period.
Security arrangements that need improvement
8.103 Audit considers that the following areas should be addressed:
Barwon Prison
Overall comment
8.104 Barwon Prison is a reasonably modern, well-equipped, publicly-operated facility that is subject to ongoing internal review. The management structure, staffing levels, and organisational philosophies at all levels of this maximum security prison are considered adequate.
8.105 The audit revealed that the prison generally met the criteria established by audit in terms of implementing appropriate security arrangements.
Actual performance compared with outcome targets
8.106 Table 8D shows the performance of Barwon Prison for the period 1 July 1998 to 28 February 1999 against certain security related service delivery outcomes contained in the Prison Services Agreement.
Required Actual
Category of service performance for
service delivery outcomes delivery period 1 July
outcomes (not 1998 to 28
more than) February 1999
Escapes (prisoner per year) 0 0
Self-mutilation/attempted suicide
(per 100 prisoner years) 2.18 1.804
Assaults on prisoners, by other
prisoners where an incident is
recorded (per 100 prisoner years) 9.60 12.630
Assaults by staff (per 100 prisoner 0 0
years)
Assaults on staff or other persons
where an incident is recorded (per 2.18 3.609
100 prisoner years)
Drug testing - percentage of
prisoners tested who test positive
for non-prescribed drug use as a
result of random testing over time 3.00 4.31
(per cent)
8.107 As indicated in the above table, the prison has exceeded the limits set for assaults on prisoners by other prisoners, assaults on staff and positive drug testing of prisoners in the period to 28 February 1999. The limits set for escapes, self-mutilations and attempted suicides, and assaults by staff have not been exceeded for the period.
Security arrangements that need improvement
8.108 Consideration should be given to reducing the amount of traffic entering Barwon Prison for stores and administration as excessive traffic flows require additional security resources and increase the risk of contraband entering the prison.
Loddon Prison
Overall comment
8.109 Loddon Prison is a reasonably modern, well-equipped medium and minimum security facility that is subject to ongoing internal and external review. The management structure, staffing levels, and organisational philosophies at all levels of the operation are adequate.
8.110 The audit found that the prison generally met the criteria established by audit for the implementation of appropriate security arrangements.
Actual performance compared with outcome targets
8.111 Table 8E shows the performance of Loddon Prison for the period 1 July 1998 to 28 February 1999 against certain security-related service delivery outcomes contained in the Prison Services Agreement.
Required Actual
Category of service performance for
service delivery outcomes delivery period 1 July
outcomes (not 1998 to 28
more than) February 1999
Escapes (prisoners per year) 0 0
Self-mutilation/attempted suicide
(per 100 prisoner years) 0.81 0
Assaults on prisoners by other
prisoners where an incident is
recorded (per 100 prisoner years) 4.05 5.164
Assaults by staff (per 100 prisoner 0 0
years)
Assaults on staff or other persons
where an incident is recorded (per 0 0
100 prisoner years)
Drug testing - percentage of
prisoners tested who test positive
for non-prescribed drug use as a
result of random testing over time 3.00 1.87
(per cent)
8.112 As indicated in the above table, the prison has exceeded the limit set for assaults on prisoners by other prisoners in the 8 month period to 28 February 1999. The limits set for escapes, self-mutilations and attempted suicides, assaults by staff, assaults on staff and positive drug testing of prisoners have not been exceeded for the period.
Dhurringile Prison
Overall comment
8.113 Dhurringile Prison is an aged facility that is reasonably well-equipped as a minimum security facility. It is subject to ongoing internal review and the management structure, staffing levels and organisational philosophies at all levels are adequate.
8.114 The prison generally met the criteria met by audit for the implementation of appropriate security arrangements.
Actual performance compared to outcome targets
8.115 Table 8F shows the performance of Dhurringile Prison for the period 1 July 1998 to 28 February 1999 against certain security-related service delivery outcomes contained in the Prison Services Agreement.
Required Actual
Category of service performance for
service delivery outcomes delivery period 1 July
outcomes (not 1998 to 28
more than) February 1999
Escapes (prisoners per year) 3 1
Self-mutilation/attempted suicide
(per 100 prisoner years) 0 0
Assaults on prisoners by other
prisoners where an incident is
recorded (per 100 prisoner years) 5.06 4.2559
Assaults by staff (per 100 prisoner 0 0
years)
Assaults on staff or other persons
where an incident is recorded (per 0 0
100 prisoner years)
Drug testing - percentage of
prisoners tested who test positive
for non-prescribed drug use as a
result of random testing over time 4.00 2.44
(per cent)
8.116 As indicated in the above table, Dhurringile Prison has performed well in comparison to the limits set for all security related outcomes for the 8 months to 28 February 1999.
Security arrangements that need improvement
8.117 Consideration should be given to up-grading the closed circuit television system at the prison.
8.118 The following comments summarise the findings of the food services specialists.
Quality of food services
8.119 The food services at the Fulham Correctional Centre and the Loddon and Barwon Prisons were very well managed and assessed to be on a par in either all or most food service operations with similar community-based institutions such as hospitals, nursing homes and residential facilities. In contrast, the food services at Port Phillip and Dhurringile Prisons were below the industry standard in some operational aspects with the former prison experiencing problems in relation to the quality of food and related operational practices. While the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre had an acceptable food services operation, it did not reflect good management practice particularly in respect of continuous security of kitchen facilities and food stores access.
Compliance with catering industry standards
8.120 The conclusions drawn from the evaluation of whether prison meals satisfied various standards are set out below.
Hygiene standards
8.121 Loddon and Barwon Prisons and Fulham and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centres were conscious of implementing hygienic practices to ensure that their food services operations met acceptable industry hygiene standards. This was evident by the use of protective clothing in the preparation of food and the apparent cleanliness of the facilities.
8.122 Dhurringile and Port Phillip Prisons were less concerned with implementing all of these standards, neglecting to comply with basic hygiene practices.
8.123 The level of hygiene and food handling training varied between each of the 6 prisons.
8.124 Under new legislation due to come into force later this year, the prison food services operations will be held more accountable for ensuring hygienic practices are enforced and monitored in the workplace.
Minimum dietary requirements
8.125 Varying attempts had been made by the prison food service managers to address nutritional dietary requirements. Fulham Correctional Centre was the only prison of the 6 visited to have commissioned a dietitian to undertake a full nutritional analysis based on the national minimum dietary requirements.
8.126 Loddon and Barwon Prisons and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre had made contact with a dietitian and sought some input on their menus, however, an ongoing detailed analysis derived from standardised recipes and ingredients had not been undertaken.
Food Act requirements
8.127 Based on the classification criteria set out in the Food (Amendment) Act 1997, prisons have been identified as a Class B premises. However, after observing the food services operations in the 6 prisons and given that prisoners are regarded by audit as a vulnerable group, i.e. they have no option but to eat the food provided by the prison, audit considers that prisons should be classified as Class A premises with more stringent deadlines for complying with the legislative amendments. Notwithstanding the categorisation of prisons as Class B premises, a Hazard Control Program as prescribed in the amendments needs to be implemented as soon as possible and constantly monitored.
Minimum standards of the Correctional Services Commissioner
8.128 All of the 6 prisons were aware of the minimum standards set by the Correctional Services Commissioner and attempted to ensure that they were achieved in their individual food service operations. However, there needs to be a more uniform approach to implementing and monitoring these standards.
Prison Services Agreements and/or contractual obligations
8.129 Audit found a lack of clearly defined management specifications and performance criteria for food services set out in the Prison Services Agreements. The current arrangements allow prison management too much discretion in interpreting the requirements outlined in the Agreements and how they are to be implemented. This makes it difficult for the Commissioner to hold prisons accountable.
Prison operating manuals covering catering services
8.130 Procedural manuals need to be living documents that are continually updated to meet new requirements. Such updates may be required as many as 3 to 4 times a year with input from all catering staff.
8.131 Audit's assessment of the catering sections of the prisons operating manuals indicated that the manual in use at the Fulham Correctional Centre was the most up-to-date manual of all the prisons visited and provided an adequate framework for the delivery of high quality food services.
8.132 The manuals and procedures at the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre and Dhurringile, Loddon and Barwon Prisons needed upgrading and should incorporate standard performance indicators to ensure uniformity of compliance. Subsequent to the audit examination, in early September 1998 new procedures have been introduced at Loddon Prison.
8.133 The manuals used by Port Phillip Prison are generic and non-specific. The manuals need to be updated to reflect the prison catering environment.
Monitoring procedures
8.134 The results of the examination of the procedures applied to monitor the quality of food provided to prisoners are outlined below.
Prison operators
8.135 There were a number of mechanisms available at Fulham Correctional Centre to monitor the quality of food, including prisoner menu suggestion forms and registers for documenting complaints about the food.
8.136 Loddon Prison undertook annual inspections which addressed issues relating to the Food Premises Code prescribed in the Food (Amendments) Act 1997. In addition, meals ordered by prisoners were recorded on a daily basis and collated to inform the Catering Supervisor of the relative popularity of dishes. A committee comprising catering staff and prisoners had also been introduced to monitor food quality.
8.137 Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre had introduced both formal and informal monitoring procedures. A committee comprising catering staff and prisoners met regularly to address issues relating to the quality of food.
8.138 Barwon Prison conducted a survey of prisoners to obtain their opinion on the quality of food. There were also formal and informal procedures for prisoners to lodge complaints.
8.139 By way of contrast, there were no formal procedures in place at Dhurringile Prison for management to monitor the quality of food. The only process by which the quality of food was monitored by management was by prisoners providing informal feedback concerning the quality of meals. At Port Phillip Prison there were documented procedures in place, however, evidence was not available to indicate that such procedures had been implemented.
Correctional Services Commissioner
8.140 Audit found that Port Phillip Prison was the only prison where the Commissioner had arranged a review of catering services. The assessment was conducted in July 1998.
Independent assessments of food quality
8.141 The audit disclosed that the quality of food provided to prisoners at the Fulham and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centres had been subject to independent assessment in December 1997.
Contracted food services
8.142 Food services in the selected prisons are delivered by staff directly employed by the prison operators, except in the case of Port Phillip Prison where the food services operation is provided under contract to the prison operator. Audit found that the contract does not contain properly defined specifications or performance criteria and as a consequence the prison operator is unable to hold the sub-contractor accountable. This contractual arrangement requires a comprehensive overhaul to ensure better quality food and that various other weaknesses including security problems relating to kitchen operations are addressed.
8.143 In audit opinion the problems arising from the deficiencies in the contract between the prison operator and the catering sub-contractor were compounded by the prison operator not monitoring the performance of the sub-contractor.
8.144 The audit also found that the Commissioner had conducted only limited monitoring of this activity.
8.145 Audit is of the view that this situation can be remedied through re-negotiating the contract to clearly specify performance criteria relating to food quality. Closer monitoring of the contract by the Commissioner is also required.
Background
8.146 The 4 food services specialists engaged to conduct this part of the audit developed a series of questions as criteria which would provide the basis for arriving at objective conclusions as to the quality of food services at each of the selected prisons. The questions covered the following areas:
8.147 A typical weekly menu for a male prisoner, which includes several choices for the evening meal, is shown below:
Breakfast (same every cereal, milk and toast
day)
Lunch Sunday 2 meat pies
Monday tomato pasta with meatballs
Tuesday rolls with tuna or sliced meat or salad
Wednesday dims sims/fried rice
Thursday 2 hamburgers
Friday fish cakes and chips
Saturday sausage and onion sizzle
Dinner Sunday roast beef or soy bean rissoles or salmon
salad and sweets (creamed rice)
Monday grilled fish or spinach pie or salami salad
Tuesday spicy plum beef or stuffed capsicums or egg
and cheese salad and sweets (scones)
Wednesday braised steak and onion or stir fry
vegetables with honey and soy or chicken
salad
Thursday crumbed chicken legs or zucchini slice or ham
and potato salad and sweets (apple pie and
cream)
Friday minted lamb casserole or bean curry or tuna
salad
Saturday spaghetti bolognese or crumbed vegetarian
sausages or curried pasta salad and sweets
(muffin)
8.148 While most prisoners eat in communal settings, prisoners accommodated in minimum security units at Loddon Prison, and Fulham and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centres prepare their own meals in communal kitchens in their units.
Audit criteria
8.149 According to the applicable legislation "... every prisoner has the right to be provided with food that is adequate to maintain the health and well-being of the prisoner".
8.150 Standards developed by the Correctional Services Commissioner require that prison operators provide:
8.151 When examining issues relating to the standard of food services in a prison setting, audit found that prison operators have interpreted the term "adequate" in the legislation and "normal community standards" prescribed by the Commissioner to mean a standard of food that an average household might consume.
8.152 The Prison Services Agreement with Port Phillip Prison contains an objective for "... the contractor to provide prisoners with food that is of sufficient quantity and nutritional value for health and well-being. Food must be prepared and delivered in a safe and efficient manner".
Food quality
Background
8.153 The kitchens of each of the 6 prisons were inspected by 2 food services specialists. The site visit to each location lasted 1 day and included a thorough tour of each prison's food services operation, including inspection of the kitchen equipment and production process, prisoner accommodation, storage areas, dining areas and food transportation equipment. The main contact persons for the visits were the prison Catering Supervisors.
8.154 The specialists took bacterial swabs from the kitchen equipment and surfaces at each prison and tested the swabs at the laboratory located at William Angliss Institute of Technical and Further Education to provide an indication of the cleanliness of the specific areas.
8.155 In addition to the site visits, documentation such as menus, kitchen equipment lists, operational manuals and legislation were reviewed.
8.156 Poor quality food can impact in many ways on the health of a person. The extent of impact is dependent on how long the person is exposed to poor quality food and their state of health before they are taken into custody. Meals are one of the most important events in a prison day.
Cook-chill food preparation system
8.157 The cook-chill system for preparing meals involves a process whereby food is cooked, then chilled in bulk or dished on to plates. When required to be served,the food is rethermalised. Under the cook-chill system, operators are required by law to keep a record of food holding time and food temperature.
8.158 Audit found that there were no controls in place to ensure that food prepared under the cook-chill system at Port Phillip Prison was reheated to the correct temperature. No documentation was available at Port Phillip Prison, the only selected prison using this system, for audit examination. The failure to observe these requirements could, in the event of prisoners suffering food poisoning, expose the prison operator and the food sub-contractor to litigation. It also means that the quality of the meal is not as good as it should be and, therefore, it loses some of its nutritional value.
8.159 Controls need to be developed at Port Phillip Prison to ensure that food prepared under the cook-chill system is reheated to the correct temperature and that food is not used after its use-by date. Documentation required by law needs to be maintained by the prison.
Special diets
8.160 Prisons are required to cater for the special dietary needs of prisoners who are, for example, vegetarians or diabetics.
8.161 All prisons changed their menus on a frequent basis and the majority catered adequately for special diets. The exception was Port Phillip Prison where an analysis of recipes by the food services consultants found that special diets were poorly catered for by the sub-contractor in that:
8.162 The operator at Port Phillip Prison needs to ensure that special dietary meals prepared by the sub-contractor do not contain inappropriate ingredients.
Nutritional diets
8.163 It is appreciated that it may not be current standard industry practice in commercial operations such as restaurants and hotels to conduct nutritional analyses of menus. However, audit is of the view that prison operators should undertake analysis of food nutrition as the recipients have no choice but to eat the food provided to them by the institution. In the absence of any such analyses, prison operators are unable to demonstrate they are complying with the requirement to provide a nutritional diet for prisoners. Consequently their ultimate health, especially those serving long-term sentences, could be at risk.
8.164 At the time of the visits, each of the prisons supplied adequate portions of food to prisoners. However, due to the absence of standardised recipes whereby portion sizes and quantities, brand names and description of ingredients were not available, it was not possible for audit to assess by reference to recipes the prison's compliance with the Commissioner's requirement that a well-balanced nutritional diet be provided to all prisoners.
8.165 The requirement by CORE that all its prisons should have their menus assessed every 6 months had not been complied with by the 3 CORE prisons (Barwon, Loddon and Dhurringile) visited by audit. Nutritional analyses of menus was a common area of neglect across all prisons visited, which demonstrated that the Commissioner had not been monitoring this important aspect of food services operations.
8.166 These matters can be addressed by prison operators obtaining relatively inexpensive off-the-shelf nutrition computer software to monitor the nutritional content of menus. To enable the monitoring to occur it will be necessary to specify portion sizes and quantities, brand names and descriptions of all ingredients. The use of this software would provide the Food Services Manager of each prison with:
8.167 Fulham Correctional Centre had its menu reviewed by a dietitian and the kitchen at Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre was inspected by the Department of Human Services in December 1997, looking at issues of food handling and hygiene. While the health service provider assessed the menu at the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre in August 1998, there has been no specific monitoring of the nutritional quality of food at any prison by the Correctional Services Commissioner.
8.168 During mid-1998 the Commissioner requested that a survey be conducted at Port Phillip Prison to ascertain prisoners' views on the quality and distribution of meals. The survey results, which were reviewed by the Commissioner, indicated that:
8.169 As a result of the survey in mid-1998, the Commissioner engaged a consultant dietitian to address the survey findings and to provide a general assessment of the food services at Port Phillip Prison.
8.170 The consultant dietitian's principal areas of concern covered in the July 1998 report included:
8.171 Notwithstanding that a copy of the consultant's report was made available to the prison operator, audit found some 4 months after the report had been issued that little if any improvements had occurred.
8.172 The Commissioner needs to develop more definitive service delivery standards covering quality of food services. This will require the development of quantitative and qualitative performance measures to support the current use of nebulous terms such as "adequate" and "normal community standards". These measures should form the basis for sound monitoring of the quality of food services in prisons.
Re-use of deep-fry fat
8.173 Both Barwon Prison and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre adopted a practice of reusing old deep-frying fat that has been used over and over again to fry food. When the fat is no longer acceptable for deep frying foods it is used as a substitute for margarine in pastries. Medical evidence suggests this practice can contribute substantially to increasing cholesterol levels and, in audit opinion, is considered highly distasteful.
8.174 To maintain the nutritional value of food provided to prisoners the repeated use of old deep-frying fat and its subsequent re-use for other purposes should be immediately discontinued.
Bacterial levels
8.175 Para film cultures are swabs taken from surfaces in food preparation and storage areas deemed to be clean, i.e. those areas which should be regularly cleaned as part of quality control procedures. If more than an acceptable amount of bacteria shows up on a para film, it indicates that correct sanitary practices have not been implemented.
8.176 Audit took para film cultures from supposedly clean surfaces and equipment including kitchen benches, tops of stoves, mixing machines and refrigerator doors in the kitchens of the 6 prisons.
8.177 Subsequent testing at the laboratory of William Angliss Institute of Technical and Further Education indicated levels of bacteria which warranted further investigation.
8.178 When examining whether food preparation surfaces are hygienic, it is critical to be aware that a clean surface may not be bacteria free even though it may have just been cleaned. Without a cleanliness policy which includes a sanitation program the presence of bacteria will always be possible.
8.179 In view of the results of the culture tests, each of the prisons needs to implement:
Preparation, delivery and storage areas
8.180 In addition to levels of bacteria found at each of the prisons, significant variations were observed in the condition of the food preparation and storage facilities of each prison.
8.181 Of the prisons visited by audit, the facilities at Fulham were assessed to be of the highest standard. The areas at the prison where the dry supplies to be used on a daily basis were stored and the bulk dry stores area were assessed by the specialist engaged by audit to be above average compared with premises such as commercial kitchen operations in hospitals, nursing homes and residential colleges. Stock was stored appropriately. The cool rooms and deep freezers were clean, orderly and well maintained.
8.182 In the opinion of the food service specialists engaged by audit, which is based on their wide experience in the food service industry, the overall work areas of the Fulham Correctional Centre were cleaner and more organised than the average commercial kitchen.
8.183 Barwon Prison's kitchen also appeared to be well maintained. Audit considered it to be one of the cleanest and most orderly in that stock was neatly stored and items commonly used were stored in accessible places.
8.184 The visit to Port Phillip Prison found little evidence of any positive outcomes for food services and that there was a need for major improvements. Specifically, the audit disclosed that:
8.185 The examination of the small catering operation at Dhurringile Prison revealed the following:
8.186 The food storage facility at the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre was generally very clean and tidy, with no evidence of unhygienic practices, such as storing food uncovered. However, on the day of its visit to the Centre audit observed that prisoners working in the storage area were smoking in very close proximity to foodstuffs.
8.187 The food storage facility at Loddon Prison was very well organised and clean, with adequate procedures for stock control. The kitchen area and equipment were equally clean and well maintained.
8.188 It is audit's view that the prison operators with inadequately maintained food storage facilities need to have in place systems and procedures to ensure that all food stuffs are stored appropriately. In addition, prison operators need to implement systematic cleaning and sanitation routines to ensure cleanliness of their kitchen premises.
8.189 Audit also suggests that CORE needs to arrange a maintenance and replacement program to cover the kitchen equipment at Barwon Prison and explore the potential for using the Technical and Further Education training kitchen at Dhurringile Prison or examine options for refurbishing the existing prison kitchen.
Personal hygiene
8.190 The standards for personal hygiene of kitchen workers require that they wear work uniforms, aprons, hairnets and plastic gloves where appropriate. Long hair should be tied back and hands and nails clean.
8.191 Emphasis on high levels of personal hygiene was evident during audit's visit to Loddon and Barwon Prisons and Fulham Correctional Centre where all kitchen staff were wearing clean uniforms, aprons, gloves and hair nets. It was evident that personal hygiene was closely monitored and regulations observed.
8.192 By way of comparison, the practices adopted at Port Phillip Prison with regard to personal hygiene among prisoner kitchen workers was found to be poor. For example, clothes worn by kitchen staff were dirty, long hair of some workers was not tied back, and gloves and aprons were not worn. A dispute between Port Phillip Prison and the food catering sub-contractor as to who should supply uniforms resulted in prisoners not wearing uniforms. Personal hygiene among prisoners working in the kitchen at Dhurringile Prison was also poor because they were not wearing gloves or hair nets. Although personal hygiene among prisoner kitchen workers at Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre was acceptable because the prisoners wore clean clothes, aprons, hair nets and gloves, prisoners were observed smoking in and around the kitchen and while unpacking food deliveries.
8.193 Prison operators at Port Phillip and Dhurringile Prisons should monitor kitchen staff's compliance with appropriate personal hygiene practices, including wearing clean uniforms and aprons, use of gloves and hair nets to ensure the safe preparation of food.
Supervision of prisoners working in kitchens
Staffing of kitchens
8.194 The composition of kitchen staff in the prisons ranged from unskilled prison labour managed by a qualified Catering Supervisor at Dhurringile Prison to a large-scale catering operation at Port Phillip Prison where prisoner kitchen workers are managed by skilled contracted staff. Prisoners were utilised in all prison kitchens.
8.195 Supervision of prison kitchen workers varied in each prison with not all kitchen staff receiving custodial training.
8.196 The audit revealed that the ratio of food services staff to prisoners varied. Audit observed that prisoners working in the kitchens at Loddon and Barwon Prisons and the Fulham Correctional Centre were supervised at all times by qualified staff. However, audit is also of the view that there were not enough supervisors to adequately control kitchen activities at the Port Phillip and Dhurringile Prisons and the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre. At Dhurringile Prison and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre, there was only 1 professional member of staff working with prisoners. As a consequence, these prisons were not in a position to ensure quality food production and the adherence to preferable security procedures such as utensil control or detection of food sabotage. Specific criticisms relating to the prisons where supervision in kitchens was lacking are described below.
8.197 At Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre and Dhurringile Prison, where as previously mentioned there was only 1 professionally trained and qualified staff member in the kitchen, there would have been many times when prisoners worked without any supervision. At Dhurringile Prison, this included every weekend and other times when the Food Services Manager was absent. The same situation occurred at Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre where prisoners worked without supervision in the kitchen at weekends.
8.198 This obviously poses serious risks in terms of:
8.199 Food services staff at Port Phillip Prison stated that they lacked confidence in their interaction with prisoners. The staff advised audit that the first 4 points in the previous paragraph had occurred at Port Phillip Prison.
8.200 Given that there is a potential risk in using prisoners as kitchen workers, there is a need for the Port Phillip and Dhurringile Prisons and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre to ensure that prisoner kitchen workers are constantly supervised and that inappropriate activities, such as the theft of potentially dangerous utensils and the sabotage of food, do not occur.
Distribution of meals
8.201 Prison staff supervised the distribution of meals to prisoners in each prison, except Port Phillip Prison where prisoners reported in a mid-1998 survey that there was no control over food distribution and it was left to prisoners to collect their meals. This practice provides an opportunity for prisoners to stand over other prisoners and take their food or simply to take 2 portions. Also it is particularly unacceptable to first time prisoners or to those prisoners who could be regarded as vulnerable and not in a position to protect their own interests. This had previously been raised in the Correctional Services Commissioner's review of food services conducted at Port Phillip Prison in July 1998.
8.202 The prison operator at Port Phillip Prison needs to review the operation of its food services area and address the recommendations of the review conducted by the Correctional Services Commissioner in July 1998.
Storage and stock control
Background
8.203 The management of a food services operation is enhanced through the adoption of effective storage and stock control procedures. Such procedures enable management to maintain control over the hygienic storage of food, monitor costs and identify any unexplained excessive use of food stock.
8.204 Particularly in a prison, stock needs to be controlled to avert pilfering, the introduction of contraband such as drugs and the use of substances such as yeast and sugar that can be used to produce illicit substances including alcoholic brews. It is for these reasons that storage and stock control activities should not be undertaken by prisoners without staff supervision.
Sound stock control and storage procedures
8.205 Features of sound storage and stock control procedures observed at Barwon and Loddon Prisons and the Fulham Correctional Centre were:
Security over foodstuffs
8.206 Unsatisfactory procedures observed at the remaining prisons that presented a serious security problem are described below:
8.207 The risk associated with the poor stock control procedures is compounded by the fact that on some occasions prisoners work unsupervised in the kitchens of these prisons. This lack of control provides prisoners with the opportunity for pilfering and use of some foodstuffs such as sugar and yeast for making home brews.
8.208 Prison operators at the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre and Dhurringile and Port Phillip Prisons need to develop more thorough procedures for receipt and control of stock.
Training of prisoner kitchen workers
8.209 Most of the prisons delivered Technical and Further Education training in Commercial Cookery and Kitchen Attending and Basic Cooking and Food Science to prisoners working in the kitchens. Fulham Correctional Centre was the only prison visited by audit which complied with the Department of Human Services' directives and the planned food legislative amendments which will require that all people who handle food will be accredited in food handling. At this Centre such training was compulsory for those who work in the kitchen.
8.210 Considering the high risk nature of the prison kitchen environment, the Commissioner should ensure compulsory training programs are available for all prisoners required to work in prison kitchens.
Legislative changes
8.211 The Food (Amendment) Act 1997 requires all businesses and institutions engaged in food preparation and serving to be classified. In addition all classified premises are required to devise and implement Food Safety Plans by no later than 30 September 1999. A Food Safety Plan is an agreed document prepared by the management of a food business and submitted for approval to the relevant local government authority. The plan describes in simple and clear terms how food safety on the premises will be ensured and the operational hazards controlled. The plan should identify the procedures and systems to manage risks inherent in a food process or operation.
Classification of premises
8.212 All businesses and institutions engaged in food preparation and serving have been classified by their local councils based on the potential risk to public health. The classification allocated to each business or institution will determine the deadline for compliance. Those businesses with higher risk classifications are required to have Food Safety Plans in place sooner than the lower risk classifications. The various classifications are listed below:
8.213 Prisons have been categorised as a Class B premises. Audit is of the view that prisons should be classified as Class A premises due to the following factors:
Food Safety Plans
8.214 Audit observed in August and September 1998 that Port Phillip Prison had developed a draft Food Safety Plan approximately 12 months in advance of the legislative deadline. At that time, none of the other 5 prisons had produced draft plans. However, as Loddon Prison had conducted hazard inspections and risk assessments of the kitchen facilities involving the same areas covered by plans, audit considered there would be no impediment to the prison preparing its plan. Other prisons such as Barwon and Fulham Correctional Centre had well-documented procedures in place, so these facilities should also be able to produce plans by 30 September 1999.
8.215 With regard to the Dhurringile Prison and Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre, the Food Services Managers indicated they were not aware of the impending requirement for the development of Food Safety Plans. Given that documented procedures at these prisons were not adequate, and that both facilities only had 1 staff member working in the food services area, it is likely that development of their plans will require considerable time and effort.
8.216 All prison operators need to ensure that they are able to comply with the legislative requirement for the development of Food Safety Plans by 30 September 1999.
8.217 Audit found that, in general, prisoners received health care services at least equivalent to those available to the community. Health care providers are required under the Prison Services Agreements to seek accreditation from an agreed authority body in health care standards. Port Phillip Prison must obtain accreditation from The Australian Council on Healthcare Standards for its secondary and tertiary medical services within 2 years of commencing operation. Subsequent to the audit fieldwork, the operator at Port Phillip Prison indicated it had recently obtained such accreditation.
8.218 Access to most services was readily available to prisoners. This included access to general practitioners, nurses, pharmacy, hospital admissions, and optometry and diagnostic services. Restrictions to free dental and physiotherapy services applied, but these were consistent with the availability of such services to the community in general.
8.219 While in almost all cases the targets set for health service delivery outcomes were met by the 6 prisons examined, only 71.4 per cent of prisoners considered at-risk to themselves at Barwon Prison, rather than all, were assessed by a psychiatric professional in the first 8 months of 1998-99.
8.220 Psychiatric services were found by audit to be in great demand and specialist treatment in inpatient units was not always available. The number of suicides over the past 12 months had increased markedly compared with recent years and this was of great public concern. Audit also found that policy and procedures for the management of prisoners likely to inflict self-harm was not uniform and co-ordination between custodial staff and clinical staff could be improved.
8.221 Part 5 of this Report includes reference to the monitoring of prisoner health care standards undertaken by the Department of Human Services on behalf of the Correctional Services Commissioner.
8.222 Consideration should be given to expanding the number of places available for treatment in specialist acute and sub-acute units particularly at Port Phillip Prison. Secondly, policies and practices to be applied to prisoners likely to harm themselves need to be reviewed on a system-wide basis and uniform policies and practices be adopted.
Background
8.223 Health care services, which comprise a range of medical, dental and auxiliary health care services, are predominantly delivered through a multi-provider system consisting of the following 5 contracted health care providers:
8.224 All prison operators are responsible for primary health care services which include medical practitioner sessions, psychiatric consultations, nursing services, dentistry, optometry, and limited access to pathology and radiology within their prisons.
8.225 Secondary health care, which comprises those services usually found in a community or district hospital is subject to referral from a primary care practitioner. Such services may include in-patient services (acute medical, surgical and accident and emergency) in-patient nursing, ambulatory care, psychiatric services not requiring involuntary admission and specialist medical services. Secondary health care services may also include support and allied health services such as physiotherapy, occupational therapy and diagnostic services.
8.226 Tertiary health care services are those services usually found in a major hospital or referral centre and include the highest levels of diagnostic and treatment services. These services are usually subject to referral from primary or secondary care. Medical and surgical services are provided at St John's Hospital in Port Phillip Prison and at St Vincent's Hospital. Any prisoners suffering psychiatric disorders are treated at the Acute Assessment Unit at Melbourne Assessment Prison or St Paul's (psycho-social unit) at Port Phillip Prison, while prisoners can also be transferred to the Mont Park Forensic Psychiatric Unit operated by the Department of Human Services.
8.227 A typical health service staffing complement in a prison will comprise general and psychiatric nurses, a general practitioner and sessions from other medical practitioners such as a dentist and consulting psychiatrist. Outpatient access to services can be organised as well as access to the prisoner hospital at Port Phillip Prison.
Audit criteria
8.228 Specialists engaged by audit evaluated prisoner health care services against criteria drawn from the following sources:
Service delivery outcomes
8.229 A summary of required service delivery outcomes and actual achievement of those outcomes by the 6 selected prisons for various periods up to 28 February 1999 is contained in Table 8G.
Metro Fulham Port Barwon Loddon Dhurring
Women's required Phillip required required ile
required outcome required outcome outcome required
Service delivery outcome and outcome and and
outcomes and actual actual and actual actual outcome
actual
and
actual
Reception 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
screenings within 99.7% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
24 hours
Proportion of 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
risk prisoners - 100% 100% 100% 71.4% 100% 100%
by a
psychiatric
professional
to be a risk to
themselves
Complaints Not more 0 per 0 per 0 per 0 per 0 per
than prisoner prisoner prisoner prisoner prisoner
0.33 per year year year year
prisoner 0 per 0 per 0 per 0 per year
year prisoner prisoner prisoner prisoner 0 per
0 per year year year year prisoner
prisoner
year year
Psychiatric services
Background
8.230 Studies undertaken in Australian prisons indicate that, while a small percentage of prisoners will develop a major long-term mental illness, many prisoners will suffer from depression and anxiety with a large number experiencing substance abuse, i.e. abuse of and/or addiction to alcohol and other drugs and behavioural problems.
8.231 Consequently, psychiatric services are a key component of prison health care services. Services need to be responsive to demands in a timely and appropriate way. Treatment, however, often takes place in difficult circumstances due to the nature of the correctional environment. It is very important for psychiatric services to be well co-ordinated, as psychiatric and associated problems are usually of long-term duration and impact on the total management of the prisoner.
Review of Suicides and Self Harm in Victorian Prisons
8.232 In August 1998, the Minister established the Victorian Correctional Services Task Force to review the procedures for identifying prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm practices in the Victorian Prisons System with particular emphasis on the operating regime.
The Task Force's terms of reference in broad terms were to consider:
8.233 The Task Force concentrated its inquiries on the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre and Port Phillip, Beechworth and Melbourne Assessment Prisons where recent suicides had occurred and made recommendations to the Department of Justice on actions to be taken at a whole-of-system level and by prison operators within each prison.
8.234 Given the level of concern about prisoner suicides and the pressure on medical, psychological and associated services reported by all prisons, the Task Force completed its review in less than 3 months. Its report, entitled Review of Suicides and Self Harm in Victorian Prisons, excluding a section withheld to protect privacy, was subsequently tabled in the Parliament on 11 May 1999.
8.235 The Task Force reported in part that:
Observation cells for at-risk prisoners
8.236 The use of observation cells, which are single cells, for at-risk prisoners requires further attention. The report of the Task Force stated "... the Task Force is convinced that isolation of suicidal prisoners is an unacceptable practice".
8.237 In the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre, and Dhurringile and Barwon Prisons observation cells for prisoners at risk of harming themselves were poorly located in close proximity to management cells. These observation cells were totally bare as all objects capable of being used to inflict self-harm had been removed. In contrast, new authoritative research suggests that stripping cells of all amenities contributes to a suicidal person's thoughts of loneliness, isolation, marginalisation and hopelessness. In audit opinion, it is difficult to imagine why any prisoner would voluntarily alert staff to their intention to attempt suicide or inflict self-harm if the final outcome was for the prisoner to be placed in an observation cell.
8.238 In line with the findings from the Task Force, alternative methods of accommodating "at-risk" prisoners should be explored. The Commissioner needs to undertake a review of the location and composition of observation cells to ensure that they are still appropriate for their purpose.
Co-ordination of services
8.239 In audit opinion, the co-ordination of psychiatric services was strained by the multi-provider system. In particular most clinical staff interviewed by audit indicated that the separation of the 2 in-patient type units located at the Melbourne Assessment Prison and Port Phillip Prison was not ideal as it was felt that the 2 units needed to work more closely together and there was a need for a greater capacity for services. This situation was most evident at Port Phillip Prison which received many prisoners who would otherwise be admitted to the Acute Assessment Unit at the Melbourne Assessment Prison.
8.240 A clear need exists for a review of the co-ordination of psychiatric services and some re-alignment of service systems.
Government initiatives
8.241 During the course of the audit, the Government, under its Suicide Prevention Program, announced additional funding of $860 000 per annum over the next 3 years to prison operators to strengthen access to psychiatric services across the prison system. Audit anticipates that the impact of this will be beneficial in that it should provide more extensive care in mainstream prisons and a lessening of demand on the Acute Assessment Unit at the Melbourne Assessment Prison.
8.242 Other initiatives included the introduction of a 24-hour telephone support service for all CORE prisons. This service provides support to prison staff who are managing an at-risk prisoner.
Medication
8.243 A criticism held by some groups of prisoner health services is the over-prescribing of medication. The audit disclosed that a high percentage of prisoners were receiving some form of medication. However, as nearly all prisoner medication was registered and controlled in prisons whereby medication was given out by nurses under prescription by the prison doctor, the numbers on medication where abuse might be suspected was not high. In addition, most clinical staff were aware of the problems associated with over-medication and the need to limit the supply of medication, particularly for night sedation.
8.244 A study of medication usage among women prisoners was conducted at the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre by the Department of Human Services' prisoner health monitoring team. This team, whose role is to monitor the delivery of health care services to prisoners, concluded that the levels of medication for prisoners after 6 months in prison was actually lower than the levels when prisoners entered the system. While this study, which involved only 1 prison, was not necessarily conclusive, a further study covering medication levels for prisoners in New South Wales by the New South Wales Corrections Health Service showed that levels of medication prescription to prisoners were comparable with Victorian levels.
8.245 Nevertheless, the requirement in the Prison Services Agreements for health care providers to manage the issue of medication, particularly psychotropic and codeine-based medication, in a responsible and professional manner and provide feedback to the prescribing doctor needs to be monitored by the Department. Keeping track of how medication was being prescribed by doctors and whether targeted education for prisoners in medication usage was appropriate should also be monitored by the Department. The Department should incorporate standards that describe upper level targets for prescription of medication into the Quality Improvement and Accreditation systems for all prison health care providers to make providers more accountable if they do over-prescribe.
- RESPONSE provided by Director, Aged Community and Mental Health, Department of Human Services
A number of the issues raised in the Report are extremely complex and require ongoing analysis. The co-ordination of in-patient psychiatric services has been raised in a number of forums including your Report and is currently under review by the Department of Justice. The Department of Human Services will be closely involved in this process.
The Report also makes mention of high levels of medication among prisoners. This is a problem experienced by all prison systems. Prisoners are, in general, a group with poor health status who commonly bring with them into custody a range of issues such as high levels of alcohol and other drug use. Demand for medication among this group is therefore high. While the Department of Human Services will continue to actively monitor this issue, the Department is equally concerned that prisoners receive appropriate medical assessment and treatment based upon sound clinical decision-making.
- RESPONSE provided by Secretary, Department of Justice
Prison security
The Commissioner concurs with audit's acknowledgment that security is a fundamental issue for the industry and notes audit's assessment that prisons generally complied with and met acceptable security standards.
In considering security issues, audit's security consultants put forward a disparate set of recommendations ranging from proposals of minor detail to broader generic security approaches.
An approach which recognised that all aspects of a prison's activities impact on and contain elements of security would have enabled the audit to have been conducted from a perspective which had greater potential to lead to recommendations which were grounded in a specific and identified philosophy and therefore congruent in their development and relationship to each other.
As a consequence of the approach taken, the greater use of the recommendations is their identification of areas which may benefit from a review of current practices, since many of the actual recommendations relate more to those implemented over the last decade in Victoria and do not necessarily demonstrate a full understanding of changed technology, changed circumstances and the changed philosophies which underpin contemporary approaches to prison security.
Examples of recommendations which prescribe a way of achieving a desired outcome but in practice have demonstrated they are not necessarily the most effective approach include the use of external risk assessors, use of common visitor control technology and separation of security from other responsibilities by appointment of a Security Manager.
The Commissioner acknowledges that in the early months of operation of each of the new prisons there was limited contact between the providers. It is clearly evident, however, that this is no longer the case, due to the efforts of the Secretary, Commissioner and the providers themselves.
The Secretary and the Commissioner place a high level of importance on developing co-operation between providers, which is amply demonstrated through the regular promoting of interaction between providers as independent operators and jointly at Industry Forums attended by senior management of the public and private sectors, meetings of the Operations Industry Group comprising prison managers of the public and private sectors, and the across provider security intelligence training undertaken by all providers.
Prison catering
The Commissioner acknowledges audit's concerns about prison catering, and is aware of the issues involved. Food, and its preparation and management is rightly of considerable importance to prisoners. Food inspection is a component of the on-going prison monitoring program. Providers have been encouraged to conduct self-audits of their catering programs, and these have already been conducted at the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre and Port Phillip Prison.
Banning of visitors to prison
When a visitor is banned from any Victorian prison - public or private- their details are immediately recorded on the prisons computer network. If a visitor attempts to access any other prison while the ban is current, then the ban details are automatically displayed when the visitor's details are entered onto the computer. All prisons have access to visitor-related data on the Prisoner Information Management System (PIMS).
A hand scanning system in place at Port Phillip Prison is part of that prison's access control system and may further minimise the possibility of a banned visitor gaining access under another guise.
Drugs in prison
The significance of the drug problem in both the community and prisons is acknowledged by the Commissioner. It is pleasing that audit has recognised the Commissioner's initiatives in this complex area at all levels of detection, deterrence and treatment. The Commissioner will continue to devote significant resources to this high Government priority area.
Suicides and self-harm in prison
A high level Inter-Departmental Committee has been established to oversee the implementation of action arising from the Victorian Correctional Services Task Force's Report on suicides and self-harm in prisons. Action commenced to date includes:
- a Corrections Health Board has been established;
- $1.5 million has been allocated in the 1999-2000 Departmental Budget for the creation of an additional ten beds to manage prisoners with acute psychiatric needs. A project is being developed to review the current configuration of the Acute Assessment Unit (AAU) and Psychosocial Unit (PSU), including the development of specifications for the proposed additional ten beds;
- $650 000 has been allocated in 1998-99 to providers to augment their suicide and self-harm initiatives. This has resulted in the provision of additional training for correctional officers, employment of additional specialist mental health staff, development of a specialist unit for young offenders on remand, and additional training for staff in all prisons to enhance their skills in identifying and managing prisoners at risk;
- the Commissioner recently organised a workshop run by Mr John Gunn, a world expert on the issue of suicide in prison. This session was attended by more that 100 staff from all prison providers and Community Correctional Services;
- a joint data system between the Commissioner's Office and Victoria Police has been developed, enabling critical information about prisoner risk factors to be transferred as prisoners move between Police cells and prison; and
- a consultant has been commissioned to undertake a project to identify 'best practice' in case management of high risk prisoners. This project will focus on such issues as the effective exchange of information between health and correctional staff.
- RESPONSE provided by Managing Director, Group 4 Correction Services Pty Ltd
The identification of issues, and the subsequent analysis, presented in this Report relate to observations which were carried out during September 1998. At that time, there were systemic issues within the Prison, and between the Prison and other elements of the Criminal Justice System which needed improving in order to secure an efficient and effective organisation.
The changes which have been effected by the management and staff, since that time, have been considerable. The intense external pressures experienced by all those working in Port Phillip Prison, were, in my view, extreme, and is a testament to the inner strength of the staff. Port Phillip Prison has now achieved a position where our service delivery meets our customer's requirements.
Security systems have been reviewed; liaison with the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, and Metropolitan Ambulance Service and the Victoria Police, has improved dramatically. Two major exercises involving all the Emergency Services and four exercises, involving the Victoria Police or the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, have been held and the Emergency Procedures modified as a result of the consequential learning. Barrier control at the Prison, to prevent illicit articles being introduced by visitors, has been thoroughly reviewed. During the twelve months between May 1998 and April 1999, the rate of assaults on prisoners has reduced, and the rate of assaults on staff is, for a prison of this type, low.
During the twelve months ending April 1999, the rate of detection of illicit drugs within the Prison, as discovered by a random general testing program, indicates that the barrier controls and other measures designed to prevent such drugs being introduced into Port Phillip Prison have been successful. This has been achieved without alienating visitors to prisoners, or official visitors to the Prison.
The Healthcare provider has gained accreditation, and the catering services have been extensively reviewed and changed.
All targets set by the Government are being met by the Prison. Regular audits managed by the Director, and by the Commissioner for Correctional Services, are taking place. There will always be room for improvement in a dynamic organisation, change is inevitable, and systems and procedures have to be reviewed regularly to ensure that best practice is maintained. Port Phillip Prison has in excess of 15 000 movements of prisoners a year, into and out of the Prison. It is regretted that there have been a number of deaths in Port Phillip Prison, but the procedures for managing those at risk of suicide and self-harm are systematically and regularly reviewed, and, where improvements to procedures can be introduced, they have been.
Port Phillip Prison has been the most audited, inspected and visited Prison in Victoria during the last 12 months. The information which has been provided by those involved in these inspections has proved helpful in assisting the management of the Prison to effect changes which the various stakeholders thought desirable. Group 4 is a responsive organisation, and will continue to evaluate suggestions for change, and to implement those which will improve the delivery of services. The quality of service delivery in May 1999 is not that which is described in this Report, which is focussed upon a period of continuing development in the Prison, in September 1998.
